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In the period from the 1990s until the end of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in 2014, the 
primary aim of Denmark’s security policy was to contribute to NATO and US-led crisis man-
agement operations. Denmark developed an expeditionary model of its armed forces capable 
of meeting the demands of asymmetric warfare while cutting its defence budget and the 
number of military personnel. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Denmark did 
not increase its defence spending and did not make any changes to its armed forces develop-
ment strategy. Meanwhile, it started paying more attention to deterrence in the Baltic region, 
adapting to NATO’s new priorities with regard to the reinforcement of collective defence. 
This led to an increase in Denmark’s military presence in the Baltic states. From Copenhagen’s 
point of view, this area could become a theatre for Russia to test NATO’s credibility and unity. 
However, Denmark sees armed conflict between Russia and NATO as highly unlikely, and con-
siders terrorism to be the main threat to its security. The need to strike a balance between the 
‘expeditionary DNA’ of the Danish armed forces and their new tasks on NATO’s eastern flank 
has triggered a discussion on the country’s shortage of military equipment and personnel, 
as well as its inadequate defence spending.
In January 2018, Denmark adopted a new Defence Agreement for 2018–2023 – a cross-party 
strategy for the development of the Danish armed forces. The Agreement, which is adopted 
by the Danish parliament every five years and implemented regardless of the current govern-
ing coalition, provides, for the first time since 1989, for an increase in defence spending of 20 
per cent, as well as a greater balance between out-of-area operations and collective defence. 
The Agreement also provides for the armed forces’ greater assistance to the police in anti-ter-
rorism measures and border control, and investments in cyber capabilities. Despite these 
changes, the Danish armed forces will remain primarily an expeditionary structure. Moreo-
ver, the planned increase in defence spending could turn out to be insufficient to implement 
the Agreement in full.
From minimalism to activism
During the Cold War, Copenhagen’s defence 
policy was based on self-imposed restraints 
in NATO. Denmark refused to host allied bas-
es and certain military exercises on its soil, and 
distanced itself from the US-Soviet arms race.
The objective of not provoking Moscow into in-
creasing military pressure on Scandinavia was 
achieved, among other things, by not consent-
ing to the deployment of nuclear weapons and 
medium-range ballistic missiles in Denmark1. 
1 The self-limiting membership of Denmark and Norway 
in NATO, together with Sweden’s and Finland’s policy of 
neutrality were elements of the so-called Nordic balance.
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Following the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and 
the ensuing enlargement of NATO to include 
Poland and the Baltic states, Denmark took 
a more active role in NATO and its alliance with 
the US2. It ceased being a country on the flank 
of the Alliance, and did not consider itself to be 
in danger of direct armed aggression. This en-
abled Copenhagen to concentrate its resources 
fully on participation in NATO crisis manage-
ment operations and US-led coalitions in the 
Middle East – always having a broad mandate 
to use force and intense combat engagement3. 
At the same time, its armed forces got rid of 
armament and military equipment which was 
unsuited for asymmetric warfare, such as sub-
marines and ground-based air defence systems. 
The aim of large-scale involvement in out-of-
area operations was to enhance Denmark’s 
standing in the international arena and make 
its armed forces an important foreign policy 
asset in relations with its key allies, mainly the 
US, followed by UK and France. The US is not 
only a key supplier of armament and military 
equipment for the Danish armed forces; coop-
eration with the US is of prime importance to 
2 The Ellemann-Jensen doctrine (Denmark’s foreign min-
ister 1982–1993). See G. Szelągowska, Dania, Warsaw 
2010, pp. 321–322.
3 After the end of the Cold War, Denmark took part in all 
NATO’s out-of-area operations (in the Balkans, Afghan-
istan, the Horn of Africa and Libya). It also contributed 
to US-led coalitions in the three Iraq wars (1990–1991, 
2003–2011 and since 2014). M. R. Olesen, J. R. Nordby, 
The Middle Eastern Decade: Denmark and Military Inter-
ventions in H. Edström, D. Gyllensporre, Alike or Differ-
ent: Scandinavian Approaches to Military Interventions, 
Santérus Academic Press Sweden, 2014, pp. 62–102; H. 
L. Saxi, Norwegian and Danish defence policy: a com-
parative study of the post-Cold War era, Norwegian In-
stitute for Defence Studies, Defence and Security Stud-
ies 1/2010, pp. 29–60.
Denmark because Copenhagen sees Washing-
ton as a guarantor of freedom of the seas and 
trade. Safe shipping routes are of fundamental 
importance to Denmark’s economy due to the 
operations of the Danish company A.P. Møller-
Mærsk, the largest freight shipping company in 
the world (it has a fleet of 590 ships, and ac-
counts for 15% of total global container trade4).
The turning point in 2014 
In 2014 the end of the ISAF operation in Afghan-
istan, which heavily engaged the Danish armed 
forces for more than a decade, coincided with 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The latter led 
NATO to focus more on collective defence and 
deterrence against Russia, particularly in the 
Baltic Sea region. This new security situation 
forced Denmark to adjust its defence policy to 
the changes taking place in NATO. This took the 
form of Danish engagement in US and subse-
quently NATO’s reassurance of the Baltic states. 
Immediately after the annexation of Crimea, 
Danish F-16s bolstered the policing of Lithu-
anian, Latvian, and Estonian airspace (BAP), 
while land forces played a more intensive part 
in allied exercises in those countries5. Denmark 
also contributed to the land component of the 
NATO–VJTF (1000 troops under UK command 
in 2017) and to the enhanced forward presence 
of allied troops in the Baltics (from 2018, 200 
troops in Estonia in the UK-led battalion-size 
battlegroup).
4 R. Milne, Maersk CEO Soren Skou on surviving a cyber 
attack, Financial Times, 12 August 2017, https://www.
ft.com/content /785711bc-7c1b-11e7-9108-edda0b-
cbc928
5 Denmark responded favourably to the need for greater 
military engagement in the Baltic states. The tradition of 
active support for the independence of Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia from the 1990s still continues in Denmark. 
The Danish contribution to reassurance the Baltic states 
in 2014–2015 was one of the largest in NATO. In the 
Saber Strike 2014 exercises in Lithuania, a Danish mech-
anised battalion took part (with a tank unit). Danish 
company-sized units also participated in month-long ex-
ercises in Lithuania (2014 and 2015) and in Latvia (2015). 
NATO’s increased focus on deterrence 
against Russia since 2014 has led to 
a greater Danish military presence in the 
Baltic states.
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From 2014, Danish military intelligence reports 
revealed growing challenges from Russia to se-
curity in the region. Even though Denmark does 
not consider a Russian attack on a NATO mem-
ber state to be a realistic scenario, it does believe 
that Russia might test the credibility and unity 
of the Alliance in the Baltic region by putting 
pressure on the Baltic states. From the Danish 
perspective the gravest threat to state’ securi-
ty continues to be terrorism, although in recent 
years Copenhagen has also paid much attention 
to illegal immigration and cyber attacks.
Measures to strike a balance between a larger 
military commitment in the Baltic Sea region 
and providing a significant contribution to re-
mote deployments (since 2014 principally in Syr-
ia, Iraq, and Mali), as well as pressure from the 
US on its European allies to address the issue of 
low defence budgets, have revived the debate 
in Denmark on insufficient defence spending 
and personnel shortages in the armed forces. 
Some politicians and members of the military 
have stressed that the level of defence spend-
ing and the armed forces’ capabilities are not 
aligned with Denmark’s’ aspirations regarding 
its role as a reliable ally to the US and an active 
member of NATO6. In 2017, there were approx-
imately 15,000 professional soldiers and 4200 
conscripts in Denmark’s armed forces.
The New Defence Agreement – 
a belated response?
The most important subjects discussed during 
the negotiation of the new Defence Agreement 
for 2018–2023 were the scale of the increase 
in defence spending, the need to adapt the ex-
peditionary model of the armed forces to the 
requirements of collective defence, whether it 
6 To give an example, due to a shortage of technical per-
sonnel and the level of wear of its F-16 fighters, Den-
mark was forced to temporarily halt the participation 
of its air force in the fight against ISIS (2015). Budget 
shortages also led to a delay of several years in the pur-
chase of military equipment (self-propelled howitzers, 
armoured personnel carriers, SM2 missiles).
was reasonable to increase the number of con-
scripts, and the part played by armed forces 
in ensuring domestic security. The final word-
ing of the new Agreement published in Janu-
ary 2018 was a consensus reached by six out 
of the nine parties in the Danish parliament7. 
This represents a compromise between the po-
sition taken by the centre-left opposition and 
the governing liberals, who are in favour of 
keeping the current model of the armed forces 
in place, and the suggestions made by the polit-
ical right. These concern more balance between 
expeditionary capabilities and engagement in 
the Baltic region, as well as investments in do-
mestic security8. Of the new initiatives provid-
ed for in the document, most funds have been 
allocated to developing a capability to deploy 
a heavy brigade outside Denmark’s borders, 
the armed forces’ assistance to the police, and 
defence against cyber attacks.
(1) Increased defence spending. The Agree-
ment provides for a gradual increase in defence 
spending, which is to rise by 20% of 2017 levels 
by 2023. However, experts estimate that this 
spending will only amount to around 1.3% of 
GDP, which means that Denmark does not in-
tend to honour the Wales 2014 NATO summit 
commitment for NATO members to increase 
spending to 2% of GDP by 2024. Nevertheless, 
in recognition of NATO’s requirements, Copen-
hagen is planning to allocate a minimum of 
20% of its defence budget to purchasing new 
7 The Danish Ministry of Defence, Agreement for Danish 
Defence 2018–2023, 28 January 2018, http://www.fmn.
dk/eng/allabout/Pages/danish-defence-agreement.aspx
8 The nationalist Danish People’s Party criticised the 
armed forces for being better prepared for battle in the 
Middle East than for defending Danish territory.
Denmark’s level of defence spending is not 
aligned with its ambitions to be a reliable 
US ally and active member of NATO.
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armament and military equipment. In 2017, 
Denmark allocated 1.17% of GDP to defence, 
which is US$4,158 billion (including 12.10% on 
new military procurements).
(2) Collective defence. The Agreement takes 
into consideration recommendations made by 
NATO defence ministers in June 2017 regard-
ing the development of the members’ defence 
capabilities. Denmark was asked to increase 
its readiness to participate in collective de-
fence in the Baltic Sea region9. To achieve this, 
from 2024 Copenhagen intends to have the 
capability to deploy a heavy brigade against 
a more equal opponent under a NATO collec-
tive defence framework, in particular in the Bal-
tic states. This brigade will be equipped with 
tanks, ground-based air defence, anti-tank 
weapons and artillery, possessing its own com-
mand support, logistics and reconnaissance. 
It will consume approximately one-third of the 
extra funds provided for in the Defence Agree-
ment. However, the creation of a new brigade 
within the army structure will not mean an ad-
ditional 4000 troops in the armed forces; the 
brigade is to be formed on the basis of “army’s 
current operational capabilities” (Denmark has 
two brigades). In practice, the brigade will be 
partly composed of mobilisation units and re-
servists (readiness for deployment within 180 
days). Moreover, the brigade’s subunits will be 
able to participate in out-of-area operations. 
It is therefore debatable whether the brigade 
will be ready for a prompt response  within the 
collective defence effort. 
9 Ch. Hyldal, Claus Hjort: Dansk Nato-brigade skal hjælpe 
med at afskrække russerne, Danmarks Radio, 29 June 
2017, https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/claus-hjort-
dansk-nato-brigade-skal-hjaelpe-med-afskraekke-
russerne
(3) Armament and military equipment. The pri-
orities in the technical modernisation of Den-
mark’s armed forces until 2023 will involve 
strengthening the areas most neglected after 
the end of the Cold War, namely air defence 
and anti-submarine warfare. The investments 
in air defence include procurement of 27 F-35 
fighter jets, which is regulated under a sepa-
rate cross-party agreement from 201610, and 
the deferred purchase of SM-2 surface-to-air 
missiles for the Iver Huitfeldt frigates11; this 
most likely means that Copenhagen wishes to 
increase its navy’s interoperability with the US 
Navy (for example in escorting aircraft carriers). 
Developing the anti-submarine capabilities of 
the Danish navy will include the purchase of 
sonars and anti-torpedo systems for vessels, as 
well as dipping sonars and torpedoes for Sea-
hawk helicopters. Closer cooperation with oth-
er countries on anti-submarine warfare is also 
envisaged.
(4) Conscription and mobilisation capabilities. 
Although Denmark has been developing its 
expeditionary armed forces for almost three 
decades, it has retained limited conscription 
(at the moment 98% of conscripts volunteer). 
The aim was not to maintain a trained reserve 
to be mobilised in the event of a conflict be-
cause the system of total defence was disman-
tled in Denmark after the end of the Cold War. 
The basic, four-month training period was in-
tended above all to encourage conscripts to join 
as professionals. The new Defence Agreement 
increases the number of conscripts by 500 (from 
4200 to 4700 annually) and extends training for 
some of them from 4 to 8 months. This decision 
was imposed mainly by the nationalist Danish 
10 The programme cost is DKK20 bn (approximately US$ 
4 bn). Aftale om anskaffelse af nye kampfly, 9 June 2016, 
http://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Documents/aftale-vedr- 
kampflyanskaffelse-2016.pdf
11 The navy will also begin preparations to acquire SM-6 
missiles. Also, Denmark is examining the purchase of 
long-range  precision  guided  missiles (potential pro-
curement in 2023–2026, no information was given as 
to the missile launching platform or the type of missile). 
Besides, Denmark maintains readiness to be part of 
NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence.
In the modernisation of Denmark’s armed 
forces, investments in air defence and 
anti-submarine capabilities will have top 
priority.
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People’s Party. The Danish armed forces did 
not favour the plans for an increased intake of 
conscripts, fearing new costs and duties for the 
professional component. The expansion of con-
scription in 2018–2023 is intended to broaden 
the recruitment base for regular troops (Den-
mark is struggling with a manning deficit, espe-
cially in the navy) and to help restore the armed 
forces’ mobilisation potential. Denmark plans 
to be able to mobilise 20,000 troops – both re-
servists and Home Guard members)12.
(5) International missions. Foreign deploy-
ments remain a priority for the armed forc-
es. The Agreement provides for an increase in 
funds of 50% for this purpose (participation in 
NATO’s battalion-sized battlegroup on eastern 
flank will also be funded using this money). 
In addition, Denmark will set up a joint deploy-
able Special Operations HQ with Belgium and 
the Netherlands. 
(6) Domestic security. The 2015 migrant crisis, 
during which a record number of asylum-seek-
ers entered Denmark, and the higher terror-
ism threat (due to Danish citizens joining ISIS, 
among other factors), have led Denmark to in-
crease the assistance which the armed forces 
give to the police in order to ensure domestic 
security. Under the Agreement, among other 
things, a light infantry battalion will be formed 
(500 troops) ready to assist with anti-terrorism 
operations, and the armed forces will still par-
ticipate in border control. The Danish police, 
which has border guard powers, is struggling 
with a lack of personnel, as it is overstretched 
12 Following mobilisation in the event of a conflict in the 
Baltic Sea region, they would mostly be involved in pro-
viding Host Nation Support.
due to its new duties connected with the mi-
grant crisis and the risk of terrorism.
(7) Cyber security. Cyber security is becoming 
more important in Denmark as the country be-
comes more digitalised. The wake-up call for 
Denmark was an attack by hackers on the de-
fence ministry in 2015–16, and a computer vi-
rus which paralysed A.P. Møller-Mærsk in 2017, 
causing estimated losses of US$300 million.
Denmark holds Russia responsible for both of 
these attacks13. Therefore, Denmark will invest 
1.4 billion kroner in cyber security by 2023. This 
will allow, among other things, the creation of 
a 24-hour national cyber situational centre to 
monitor cyber security threats14. 
(8) The Arctic. The Arctic is of vital importance 
for Denmark. Copenhagen has retained control 
over autonomous Greenland, making Denmark 
a member of the Arctic Council. It enhances 
Denmark’s international standing, and brings 
the prospect of extracting Arctic natural re-
sources15. The Arctic is also an important area 
of cooperation with the US because of the lat-
ter’s military presence in Greenland (the Thule 
radar station)16. The Defence Agreement pro-
vides for the greater activity of armed forces 
13 C. Hjort (Denmark’s defence minister), ‘Rusland stod 
bag cyberangreb mod Mærsk’, KrigerenDK, 15 February 
2018, http://krigeren.dk/claus-hjort-rusland-stod-bag-
cyberangreb-maersk/
14 Denmark will also join the NATO Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence in Tallinn and the Helsinki-based European 
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.
15 The Act on Greenland Self-Government from 2009 ex-
tended island’s autonomy, acknowledging the people of 
Greenland as a separate nation with a right to self-de-
termination. Under the Act, Greenland can obtain in-
dependence by means of economic emancipation from 
Denmark (two-thirds of Greenland’s budget still consists 
of subsidies from Denmark) and inter-government ne-
gotiations, followed by a referendum. Copenhagen re-
mains responsible for Greenland’s foreign and security 
policy. See P. Uziębło, Podstawy ustroju Grenlandii (wy-
brane zagadnienia), Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego, 
Nr 1(17)/2014, http://www.marszalek.com.pl/przeglad-
prawakonstytucyjnego/ppk17/01.pdf
16 The US military presence on the island is sanctioned un-
der the bilateral agreement with Denmark on the de-
fence of Greenland from 1951.
The migrant crisis and terrorism threat has 
led the Danish armed forces to play a great-
er role in providing domestic security.
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in the Arctic (including patrolling and search & 
rescue operations). The Agreement also guaran-
tees funds for eliminating environmental con-
tamination in former US military installations in 
Greenland. Denmark is worried that this matter 
could inflame anti-Danish feeling and benefit 
an independence movement. However, the Arc-
tic is low on the list of the defence ministry’s 
financial priorities. This is due to Denmark’s un-
willingness to militarise the Arctic (Denmark is 
aware that it has insufficient potential to take 
part in an Arctic arms race), as well as the fact 
that until now the Arctic has been an area of 
cooperation based on international law. 
Question marks
While the new Defence Agreement provides for 
the greater involvement of the armed forces in 
providing domestic security and greater mo-
bilisation capabilities, the Danish army will re-
main primarily an expeditionary structure until 
2023. There will be no fundamental change to 
the model for the armed forces, and the objec-
tive of the new strategy is above all to achieve 
greater flexibility for the army when responding 
to various kinds of threat. After more than two 
decades of focusing on crisis management oper-
ations and asymmetric warfare, it will take time 
to develop a capability to fight in conventional 
conflict under a collective defence framework.
It could prove difficult for Denmark to put these 
ambitious plans for 2018–2023 into practice for 
financial reasons. While the Defence Agree-
ment provides for a reversal of the downward 
trend in defence spending, at the same time 
there are only plans for a return to the level of 
spending that existed prior to 2013. Also, the 
largest share of the planned rise in defence 
spending has been put off until 2022–2023, 
and so, despite the armed forces’ urgent needs, 
the defence budget will continue to stagnate in 
the coming years. The Ukraine crisis and pres-
sure from the Trump administration have not 
led the Danish political parties to take measures 
to gradually increase the defence budget to the 
target of 2% of GDP. This is mainly because so-
cial spending and the welfare state are always 
priority issues in Danish elections. The fact that 
there is no perceived threat in Denmark of direct 
armed aggression is also a factor; according to 
opinion polls, only one in three Danes believes 
that Russia poses a threat to their country17. 
Denmark will probably continue to try to com-
pensate for the low defence spending in the 
form of major expeditionary involvement in 
NATO and US-led operations. However, this 
policy might be limited in its success due to 
a current lack of operations on the scale of ISAF. 
Also, while NATO was focused on out-of-area 
operations, Denmark’s low defence spending 
went unnoticed due to the defence budgets of 
a number of allied countries being lower than 
Denmark’s in GDP percentage terms. Howev-
er, the return to the deterrence against Russia 
since 2014 has led to a gradual rise in the Eu-
ropean NATO members’ defence spending; ac-
cording to forecasts, by 2024 more than half of 
the allied countries could have reached 2% of 
GDP18. This will make it difficult for Denmark to 
sustain the image of a sound NATO member, 
as in the period up until 2023 it only intends 
to raise its defence budget by 0.1 percentage 
points (to 1.3% of GDP).
In the coming years Denmark wishes to inten-
sify the activity of its armed forces domestical-
ly, regionally, and globally – from the Arctic, 
through NATO’s eastern flank, to the Mid-
dle East. In view of the moderate increase in 
defence spending (and personnel shortages), 
17 M. Jensen, Russisk trussel bekymrer hver tredje – vores 
naboer tager det mere alvorligt, TV2, 14 January 2018, 
http://nyheder.tv2.dk/samfund/2018-01-14-russisk-trus-
sel-bekymrer-hver-tredje-vores-naboer-tager-det-mere-
alvorligt
18 J. Ringsmose, Militærforsker: Danmarks rolle som Na-
to-duks står for fald, Altinget, 18 March 2018, https://
www.altinget.dk/eu/artikel/militaerforsker-danmarks-
rolle-som-nato-duks-staar-for-fald#.Wqi6XzyC8II.face-
book
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it could turn out to be impossible to reconcile 
such activity in so many areas. Especially as the 
most expensive modernisation programme in 
the history of Denmark’s armed forces – the 
purchase of F-35 fighter jets – will be an enor-
mous burden on Denmark’s defence budget 
in the period to 202619.
19 The Danish media are reporting more and more frequent-
ly that the value of the contract was underestimated.
